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Abstract. The presence of capital market supporting professions and institutions such as 
auditor and underwriter are required by the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) to assist issuing 
company in the process of going public. Using a total of 156 non-financial firm IPOs listed on 
IDX during the period 2007-2017, the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of 
auditor’s reputation, underwriter’s market share and spread on level of underpricing, The 
method used in this paper is pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Findings of this 
paper showed that underwriter’s market share and auditor’s reputation have a significant 
negative effect on level of underpricing, while underwriter’s spread is insignificant to 
underpricing. This paper concludes that in Indonesia underpricing is lower for IPO firm that 
associated with reputable auditor and high-market share underwriter. Also, underwriters use 
their spread to substitute underpricing rather than using it as a complement. 
1. Introduction 
Firm’s financing decision with issuance of new stocks to be listed on the stock exchange is known as 
going public or Initial Public Offering (IPO). In the IPO literatures, underpricing has been one of the 
most heavily investigated topics. In fact, underpricing has been considered as global phenomenon 
because it violates the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and several past studies have shown that 
underpricing happened in different market across countries during different time period (Loughran, 
Ritter, & Rydqvist, 1994). The puzzle of IPO underpricing is an interesting topic to be explored 
because it leaves big question as to why firm left money on the table and decided to price their shares 
in a manner that results large initial returns. 
 
Underpricing also found out to be happened in Indonesia in 2007-2017 with average of 29.97%. 
During last decade, IPO market in Indonesia has been significantly growing and also there has been a 
notable change in the trend of offer price pricing method from using earnings forecast to book-
building method. In Indonesia, the IPO market is being regulated by Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
and the Financial Services Authority of Indonesia (OJK), where both require firms to appoint capital 
market supporting professions and institutions to assist them in the process of going public. In this 
study, capital market supporting professions were being focused on underwriters and auditors because 
the two professions hold vital roles in ensuring the success of a firm’s IPO. Underwriter roles start 
from the very beginning process of IPO that are valuing the firm, assembling an underwriter syndicate, 
conducting book-building and road show (marketing), and even stabilizing the aftermarket (based on a 
firm commitment offering). On the other side, auditor have role on auditing the required financial 
statement published on prospectus that is a primary source of information for investor’s investing 
decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is interested in shedding light on the effect of auditor’s reputation, underwriter’s market 
share and spread on underpricing of Indonesia IPOs during the period 2007-2017 based on existing 
theories. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides brief prior literature 
and hypothesis development. Section 3 discusses the data selection and methodology. Section 4 
provides empirical results and finally, we offer our concluding remark in section 5. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Underpricing is known as the difference between offer price and closing bid price on the initial trading 
day (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). Therefore, the presence of underpricing is indicated by positive initial 
return. There are several existing literatures about underpricing but these explanations stem from the 
presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information among the issuers, external parties (such as 
underwriters and auditors) and the investors. The fundamental explanations underlying this paper are 
winner’s curse and signalling theory. 
 
2.1 Winner’s curse (asymmetric information) theory 
This theory was developed by Rock (1986) based on Capen, Clapp, & Campbell (1971) preposition 
that in any kind of auction, because the value is uncertain then the winner is usually overvaluing it, 
therefore only gives return that is relatively low or even negative. Rock divided investors in the IPO 
market in to two groups, informed and uninformed investors. Informed investors are the one with 
better and more information regarding value of the issuing firm. This type of investors will only 
participate in the IPO of a firm that price their shares in underpriced manner with expectation of 
getting positive initial return. As for uninformed investors, since they held less information, they are 
most likely become subject to overpriced shares and therefore less interested to participate in initial 
public offering. This will lead to reduced succession chance of a firm’s IPO. The way to attract 
uninformed investors is to compensate the asymmetric information by providing sufficient discount to 
the offer price, in other term employing underpricing (Ljungqvist, 1993). Rock’s model has limited 
empirical results and later was developed by Beatty & Ritter (1986) with the concept of ex-ante 
uncertainty. They stated that investors in the IPO market generally will face uncertainty regarding the 
value of the firm and its offer price. This uncertainty is known as ex-ante uncertainty (such as issuing 
scales, firms’ age and equity retention ratio). The higher the uncertainty leads to higher underpricing 
demanded by investors (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). 
 
2.2 Signalling theory 
This theory stated that in the investment market, there are two kinds of firms; high-quality and low-
quality firm (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989). It is difficult for investors to distinguish these two types of 
firms that lead to the produce of asymmetric information. Hence, high-quality firms tend to give signal 
about their true quality by means of initial owners retention (Grinblatt, Mark, & Hwang, 1989), choice 
of underwriter (Titman & Trueman, 1986) and also auditor (Holland & Horton, 1993). High-quality 
firms tend to retained large portion of their shares and engage more in underpricing because they are 
confident to be able to recover the cost of doing underpricing by selling their retained shares with 
higher price in the secondary market or through Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) with larger total 
proceeds. On the other side, high-quality firms tend to be associated with reputable underwriter and 
auditor because they have reputation to uphold therefore increases the precision of information 
revealed to the market and able to reduce uncertainty (Michaely & Shaw, 1995). 
 
2.3 Auditor’s reputation and underpricing 
Audited financial statement is one of the information details required to be disclosed in the prospectus 
of issuing firms, therefore auditors play an important role in the IPO process. As stated before, 
selection of auditor can be considered as a signal that reveals information about the value of the firm. 
Prestigious auditors have the commitment to maintain their audit credibility because their reputation 
can be damaged by later revelation of errors or misstatements (Palmrose, 1988). By hiring prestigious 
auditor, the uncertainty and asymmetric information surrounding the issuing firm most likely will be 
reduced because the hired auditor decreases firm’s opportunity to cheat in presenting misleading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
information. Thus, this will lead to reduced level of underpricing. Prestigious auditors also tend to be 
associated with less risky IPOs because they have reputation to uphold. It is known that risky IPOs are 
difficult to evaluate, have higher level of uncertainty and therefore more likely to be underpriced. 
From the issuing firm side, it also found out that high-quality firms have more incentive to enlist 
prestigious auditor service because it brings higher marginal benefit as their good quality can be 
conveyed well to the market (Michaely & Shaw, 1995).  
 Hypothesis 1. Auditor’s reputation has negative effect on underpricing. 
 
2.4 Underwriter’s market share and underpricing 
Pricing the offer price is one of the main functions of underwriters in the IPO market (Allen & 
Faulhaber, 1989). The competition in the underwriting market will encourage underwriters to price the 
offer price in a prudent manner because any mispricing (over or underpricing) may cause underwriters 
to face loss of future revenues. Hence, this will lead to decreased underwriter’s market share as 
investors may be hesitant in trusting their services for future issues pricing. In fact, underwriter’s 
reputation is damaged every time they generate inaccurate information that leads to inaccurate pricing 
therefore reputable underwriters screen risky IPO firms, which are more difficult to evaluate and tend 
to be underpriced, to protect their own reputational capital (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). 
 
Underpricing is also known as indirect cost of going public. Employing underpricing is quiet pricey 
for issuing firm, hence low-risk firm try to relay their low-risk features to the market by using services 
of good reputation underwriter (Ammer & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2016). The reputation of underwriter can 
minimize the ex-ante uncertainty linked with IPO by supporting firm’s management to reveal relevant 
information for investor’s need which leads to lower asymmetric information and underpricing. In 
Carter & Manaster (1990), prestigious underwriters significantly reduce underpricing, same result also 
founded in Megginson & Weiss (1990) who used market share as a proxy of underwriter’s reputation.  
 Hypothesis 2. Underwriter’s market share has negative effect on underpricing. 
 
2.5 Underwriter’s spread and underpricing 
Underwriters’ revenue is generated from spread which consists of fixed and variable components. The 
fixed component is often associated to measurable underwriting services such as offering size, and the 
variable component is associated with risk such as price uncertainty of the new issue (Chen & Mohan, 
2002). Underwriters use their spread as a risk-bearing function because of the fact that they face loss if 
IPO sells at a price lower than the preset offer price but prevented from selling shares at higher price 
with the increase of market price. For underwriters, there are two ways to price the issuing firm’s risk: 
explicitly (underwriter’s spread) and implicitly (underpricing). The relationship between spread and 
underpricing based on Chen & Mohan (2002) is found to be complementary, that is underwriters raise 
the spread if higher underpricing alone is not sufficient to compensate the assumed risk. 
 Hypothesis 3. Underwriter’s spread has positive effect on underpricing.  
 
3. Research data and methodology 
3.1 Data Selection 
This paper’s data include all firm that going public on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 
period of 2007 until the first semester of 2017. Criteria for the data selection are non-financial 
underpriced firms with underwriting contract based on full commitment offerings. Accordingly, 34 
financial firms, 31 overpriced IPO firms, and 2 firms that lack of data availability were excluded from 
the sample. The final sample of this research narrowed at 156 out of 223 IPOs. Main sources of the 
data were collected from the IDX fact books and firms’ prospectuses. 
 
3.2 Research method 
We test our three hypotheses regarding the effect of auditor’s reputation, underwriter’s market share 
and spread on IPO underpricing with pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. Our regression 
model is presented as follows: 
𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 +  𝜶𝟏𝑼𝑵𝑫_𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 +  𝜶𝟐𝑼𝑵𝑫_𝑺𝑷𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝑨𝑼𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺    (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where: 
Dependent Variable Measurement of Variables 
Initial Return Difference between closing price on the initial trading day and initial offering price 
divided by the initial offering price 
Independent Variable  
UND_MS Developed from Carter & Manaster (1990) with following steps: 
1.Ranking the underwriter using three indicator: trading value, volume and 
frequency based on IDX’s Fact Book Most Active Members Lists 
2. Assign score  to the underwriters with the following requirements: 
a. 1st rank is given a score of ten, and so on until the 10th rank which is given a score 
of 1 
b. 11th to 15th rank is given a score of 0.5 
c. 16th to 20th rank is given a score of 0.25 
d. >20th rank is given a score of 0.125 
3. Accumulating the score and then dividing it by the numbers of underwriter 
included in the IPO to anticipate syndicate underwriter (more than 1 involved) 
4. Assign binary number of “1” if the final score above median value which means 
high-market share underwriter and “0” otherwise 
UND_SPR Summation of fees charged by the underwriter that consists of underwriting fee, 
selling fee, and management fee 
AUD Assign binary number of “1” if auditor is associated with Big Four accounting firms 
such as Ernst & Young (EY), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT), Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers and Klynveldt Pield Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) and “0” otherwise 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for 156 Indonesian IPOs during period of 2007-2017. 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
IR (%) 0.299667 0.206389 0.240020 0.010811 0.700000 
AUD 0.250000 0.000000 0.434407 0.000000 1.000000 
UND_MS 0.500000 0.500000 0.501610 0.000000 1.000000 
UND_SPR (%) 0.021440 0.020000 0.013475 0.002650 0.140100 
The results from descriptive statistics showed that the average initial return (underpricing) on 
Indonesian IPOs is 29.97%, which is quite high compared to another country from previous studies. 
The mean value of auditor’s reputation is 0.250000 which indicates that only 39 out of 156 IPOs 
sample used auditing services from reputable or prestigious auditor. Mean value of underwriter’s 
market share is 0.500000 which indicates that 78 out of 156 IPOs sample used underwriting services 
from high-market share underwriters. As for the underwriter’s spread, the mean value is 0.021440 
which indicates on average the fees charged by underwriters in Indonesia is 2.144%.  
4.2 Pooled OLS regression results 
Table 2. Pooled OLS regression result. 
 Expected Sign Coefficient t-Statistic 
AUD - -0.122230 -3.037965*** 
UND_MS - -0.174742 -5.013604*** 
UND_SPR + -0.097107 -0.074772 
Constant  0.399798 11.23252*** 
Adjusted R2  19.53%  
F-value  12.40799***  
Notes: ***, ** and * denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
From the pooled OLS regression, the results showed that auditor’s reputation has negative and 
significant effect on level of underpricing. This result supports our first hypothesis and consistent with 
 
 
 
 
 
 
prior study by Michaely & Shaw (1995) where more reputable or prestigious auditors can help to 
reduce level of uncertainty and asymmetric information, therefore lowering the underpricing level. In 
terms of underwriter’s market share, it is found to be negatively and significantly affect level of 
underpricing. This result supports our second hypothesis and in line with some previous studies by 
Carter & Manaster (1990) and Megginson & Weiss (1990). As for underwriter’s spread, it is found that 
spread has negative insignificant effect on level of underpricing. This result is in contrast to our third 
hypothesis as well to prior study by Chen & Mohan (2002). From the result, we found that in 
Indonesia, underwriters do not use spread to complement underpricing. Rather than using it as a 
complement, from the negative effect it is most likely that underwriters use spread as substitution to 
underpricing because the higher the spread charged will result to lower level of underpricing. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the effect of auditor’s reputation, underwriter’s market share and spread on level 
of underpricing using 156 IPOs listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2007 to 2017. 
By employing pooled OLS regression, we found that underpricing on average are lower for IPO firm 
that used services from reputable auditor and high-market share underwriter. We also found that in 
Indonesia, underwriter’s spread do not have significant effect on the level of underpricing. Our paper 
has implications in which it is limited to only full commitment underwriting IPOs contract and only 
used external parties to explain underpricing. For extension studies, variables such as firm’s specific 
characteristics that represent the internal party may be taken into account as in IPO process the firm 
itself plays an important role. Also, industry-wise classification would be better in explaining 
underpricing accordingly as this study excluded financial firm but did not differentiate the industry of 
the sample. 
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